mirror of
https://github.com/willmiao/ComfyUI-Lora-Manager.git
synced 2026-08-07 06:20:15 -03:00
fix(security): use abspath instead of realpath in containment checks to support symlinks (#1028)
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@@ -137,7 +137,13 @@ npm run test:coverage # Generate coverage report
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- Dual mode: ComfyUI plugin (folder_paths) vs standalone (settings.json)
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- Detection: `os.environ.get("LORA_MANAGER_STANDALONE", "0") == "1"`
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- Run `python scripts/sync_translation_keys.py` after adding UI strings to `locales/en.json`
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- Symlinks require normalized paths
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- Symlinks require normalized paths.
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**Business paths vs real paths**: All stored paths and operation routing use the
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original paths as they appear under configured model roots — symlinks are NOT
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resolved. `os.path.realpath` is only for scanner dedup and the symlink cache.
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Any path passed to `os.remove`/`os.rename`/`shutil.move` or validated by a
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containment check MUST use the business path (i.e. `os.path.abspath`, not
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`realpath`).
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## Git / Commit Messages
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@@ -1392,8 +1392,8 @@ class DownloadManager:
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base_save_dir = save_dir
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save_dir = os.path.join(save_dir, relative_path)
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# Security: validate path containment after joining
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resolved_dir = os.path.realpath(os.path.normpath(save_dir))
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base_dir = os.path.realpath(os.path.normpath(base_save_dir))
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resolved_dir = os.path.abspath(os.path.normpath(save_dir))
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base_dir = os.path.abspath(os.path.normpath(base_save_dir))
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if not resolved_dir.startswith(base_dir + os.sep) and resolved_dir != base_dir:
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logger.warning(
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"Path traversal detected: %s escapes %s",
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@@ -51,9 +51,10 @@ async def delete_model_artifacts(
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def _require_path_in_library_roots(file_path: str, scanner, *, label: str = "path") -> None:
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"""Raise ``ValueError`` if *file_path* is not inside a configured model root.
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Uses ``os.path.realpath()`` to resolve symlinks before comparing,
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so symlink-based escapes are also caught. Skips when the scanner
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does not expose ``get_model_roots`` or the list is empty.
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Uses ``os.path.abspath()`` (NOT ``realpath``) to resolve ``..`` and ``.``
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while preserving symlinks — this keeps the check in business-path space.
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Skips when the scanner does not expose ``get_model_roots`` or the list
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is empty.
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"""
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roots = None
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@@ -65,10 +66,10 @@ def _require_path_in_library_roots(file_path: str, scanner, *, label: str = "pat
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if not roots:
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return
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resolved = os.path.realpath(os.path.normpath(file_path))
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resolved = os.path.abspath(os.path.normpath(file_path))
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for root in roots:
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root_resolved = os.path.realpath(os.path.normpath(root))
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root_resolved = os.path.abspath(os.path.normpath(root))
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if resolved == root_resolved or resolved.startswith(root_resolved + os.sep):
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return
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@@ -1248,6 +1248,50 @@ def test_relative_path_sanitizes_double_slashes():
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assert relative_path == "SDXL/no tags/Author"
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def test_download_containment_accepts_symlink_save_dir(tmp_path):
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"""Verify the download path containment check (download_manager.py:1395-1397)
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accepts save directories reached through user-created symlinks inside the
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library root — reproducing the symlink scenario from issue #1028."""
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# Library root with a symlink subdirectory pointing to an external drive
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lora_root = tmp_path / "loras"
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lora_root.mkdir()
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external_drive = tmp_path / "external" / "models"
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external_drive.mkdir(parents=True)
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symlink = lora_root / "Krea 2"
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symlink.symlink_to(str(external_drive))
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# Simulate a download: base_save_dir = library root,
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# relative_path = "Krea 2/concept/NewModel"
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base_save_dir = str(lora_root)
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save_dir = os.path.join(base_save_dir, "Krea 2", "concept", "NewModel")
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# Replicate the exact containment check from download_manager.py
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resolved_dir = os.path.abspath(os.path.normpath(save_dir))
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base_dir = os.path.abspath(os.path.normpath(base_save_dir))
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# Must NOT be rejected — symlinks are legitimate business paths
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assert resolved_dir.startswith(base_dir + os.sep)
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def test_download_containment_rejects_dot_dot_traversal(tmp_path):
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"""Verify the download path containment check still blocks ``..`` traversal
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after the realpath → abspath change."""
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lora_root = tmp_path / "loras"
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lora_root.mkdir()
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base_save_dir = str(lora_root)
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save_dir = os.path.join(base_save_dir, "..", "..", "etc", "passwd")
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resolved_dir = os.path.abspath(os.path.normpath(save_dir))
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base_dir = os.path.abspath(os.path.normpath(base_save_dir))
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# Must be rejected — dot-dot escapes the library root
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assert not resolved_dir.startswith(base_dir + os.sep)
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assert resolved_dir != base_dir
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def test_distribute_preview_to_entries_moves_and_copies(tmp_path):
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"""Test that preview distribution moves file to first entry and copies to others."""
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manager = DownloadManager()
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@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
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import json
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import os
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from pathlib import Path
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import pytest
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@@ -51,11 +52,12 @@ class TestRequirePathInLibraryRoots:
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scanner = ScannerWithRoots([str(root)])
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_require_path_in_library_roots(str(root), scanner)
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def test_rejects_symlink_escape(self, tmp_path):
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def test_accepts_symlink_within_root(self, tmp_path):
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"""Symlinks under a configured root are legitimate business paths
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and should be accepted — containment works on business-path space,
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not resolved physical paths."""
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root = tmp_path / "loras"
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root.mkdir()
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model = root / "model.safetensors"
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model.write_text("")
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outside_dir = tmp_path / "outside"
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outside_dir.mkdir()
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@@ -65,9 +67,22 @@ class TestRequirePathInLibraryRoots:
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symlink = root / "link.safetensors"
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symlink.symlink_to(outside_file)
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scanner = ScannerWithRoots([str(root)])
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# Symlink path is under root in business-path space → accepted
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_require_path_in_library_roots(str(symlink), scanner)
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def test_rejects_dot_dot_traversal(self, tmp_path):
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"""Verify that ``..`` components are still resolved and blocked —
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``abspath`` normalises dot-dot but does not resolve symlinks."""
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root = tmp_path / "loras"
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root.mkdir()
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# A path that traverses up out of the root via ..
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escaped = os.path.join(str(root), "..", "..", "etc", "passwd")
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scanner = ScannerWithRoots([str(root)])
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with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="outside configured library"):
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_require_path_in_library_roots(str(symlink), scanner)
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_require_path_in_library_roots(escaped, scanner)
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class ScannerForDelete:
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